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Despite growing knowledge and education
about various groups of people, stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination remain in
present society (Fiske, 1998). It is
unacceptable for people to openly show
dislike or favoritism toward various groups of
people due to an emphasis on being politically
correct in America today (Voils, AshburnNardo, & Monteith, 2002). Most people today
have direct contact with other diverse groups
of people. People who have exposure to other
diverse groups of people tend to view these
other diverse groups of people at the very
least as human beings with equal basic legal
rights (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). People
have established laws to ban discrimination
against certain groups of people such as
African Americans, women, and people with
disabilities
(http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html).
However, even with increased exposure and
education to other diverse groups of people,
some of these groups of people (i.e.,
homosexuals, people with mental disabilities,
and the elderly) still experience stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination (Shelton &
Richeson, 2005).

Stereotypes
A stereotype is a collection of
attributes that are applied by an individual to
another person or group of people (Fiske,
1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Snyder &
Miene, 1994). Because individuals are
regularly exposed to a large amount of
information, it is necessary to use cognitive
shortcuts to reduce the cognitive effort needed
to process incoming information (Macrae,
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Snyder &
Miene, 1994). If an individual holds a
stereotype about a certain group of people,
that individual may use his or her stereotype
to try and predict attributes and behaviors of a
person in that certain group of people (Fiske,
1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae et
al., 1994). For example, if a perceiver sees a
man with bright clothing, a slight build, and
meticulously coiffed hair, this perceiver may
believe that this man is gay because this man
fits into this perceiver’s stereotype of a gay
male. This perceiver may also use his or her
gay male stereotype to predict that this man
must also be effeminate in his mannerisms
and knows how to decorate houses.
Individuals use stereotypes to pay
attention to stereotype-confirming
information and to not pay attention to
stereotype-disconfirming information (Fiske,
1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; von
Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995).
Individuals form stereotypes based on what
information is important to these individuals
about other individuals (Fiske, 1998). When
individuals notice information that is
important to them, a stereotype may be
triggered (Biernat & Ma, 2005; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). For example, a
perceiver may believe it is very important to
know the sexual orientations of people with
whom he or she interacts. If this perceiver has
a stereotype of lesbians as being masculine
and meets a woman with very short hair and
trousers, this stereotype-confirming
information could be used by this perceiver to
reinforce this perceiver’s stereotype of
lesbians as being masculine. However, this
perceiver may not have noticed that this
woman had painted fingernails and a feminine

blouse. This perceiver would not use this
stereotype inconsistent information to prevent
this perceiver from categorizing this woman
as a lesbian and disconfirm this perceiver’s
stereotype of lesbians as masculine.
Individuals use information they
notice about other individuals to categorize
these other individuals (Fiske, 1998; Hilton &
von Hippel, 1996). Because an individual
may notice an attribute of another person that
corresponds with a stereotype of a certain
group of people, that individual may then
categorize that other person as belonging to
that certain group of people (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). For example, a perceiver may
interpret short hair and trousers on women as
attributes of lesbians. Based on information
this perceiver noticed about a woman, this
perceiver may categorize this woman with
short hair and trousers as a lesbian.
Individuals may interpret information
about other individuals in different ways as
this information relates to those individuals’
stereotypes (Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge,
1993; Pettigrew, 1979). Information can be
interpreted positively, negatively, or neutrally
(Jackson et al., 1993; Pettigrew, 1979). For
example, one perceiver may view a man who
dresses flamboyantly and has well coiffed
hair as being an indicator that this man’s
sexual orientation is gay. Another perceiver
may view this man who dresses flamboyantly
and has well coiffed hair as being an indicator
that this man’s profession is creative.
Individuals are also more likely to
remember stereotype-confirming information
than to remember stereotype-disconfirming
information (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).
Because individuals notice stereotypeconfirming information more often than they
notice stereotyping-disconfirming
information, these individuals get repeated
exposure to and pay more attention to
stereotype-confirming information than to
stereotyping-disconfirming information
(Cameron & Trope, 2004; Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996; Trope & Thompson, 1997).
When individuals repeatedly attend to certain
information, these individuals are likely to
remember this certain information (Hilton &

von Hippel, 1996). For example, if a
perceiver notices that a gay man wears
flamboyant clothing on a daily basis, this
perceiver’s repeated exposure to this
information may lead to a strengthening of
this perceiver’s stereotype of gay men
dressing flamboyantly.
Individuals use stereotypes to recall
attributes of another person or group of
people (Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel,
1996). Because stereotype-confirming
information is more effectively stored in
memory than is stereotype-disconfirming
information, individuals can more easily
retrieve and recall from memory stereotypeconfirming information than from stereotypedisconfirming information (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). For example, when a perceiver
with a stereotype of lesbians as being
masculine recalls meeting a woman with short
hair and trousers, this perceiver is more likely
to remember this woman’s short hair and
trousers and less likely remember this
woman’s painted nails or feminine blouse.
Individuals use stereotypes to infer
attributes about another person or group of
people (Fiske, 1998). Individuals use
stereotypes as cognitive shortcuts to reduce
these individuals’ cognitive effort to help
these individuals predict attributes and
behaviors of others (Biernat & Ma, 2005;
Fiske, 1998). When individuals can predict
several attributes and behaviors of others
based on a few known attributes, these
individuals save themselves the cognitive
effort of finding out more about those others
(Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).
Individuals’ stereotypes of groups of people
are composed of lists of attributes that these
individuals expect these groups to have
(Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). Individuals may use
these lists of attributes to infer missing
information about other individuals that these
individuals have categorized as members of
those stereotyped groups (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).
For example, a perceiver’s stereotype about
gay men as effeminate may include that gay
men are flamboyantly dressed, sexually

promiscuous, artistic, and weak. When this
perceiver sees a man who is flamboyantly
dressed and this perceiver has categorized that
man as a gay man, this perceiver may also
infer that because that man is a gay man, that
man must also be sexually promiscuous,
artistic, and weak to match this perceiver’s
stereotype of a gay man.
Individuals use stereotypes to make
judgments about other individuals and groups
(Fiske, 1998). Stereotypes are composed of
attributes about people in those stereotyped
groups (Gill, 2004). Some individuals may
value certain attributes and devalue other
attributes. Individuals may judge people
within those groups based on those attributes
these individuals believe these groups possess
(Gill, 2004). For example, if a perceiver has a
stereotype of lesbians as being masculine, this
perceiver may view women who have
masculine attributes as being lesbian and also
as being deviant from feminine women. This
perceiver views deviation of women from
being feminine as negative and will view
women with masculine attributes as lesbian
and also as negative. If this perceiver meets a
woman with masculine attributes, this
perceiver will likely classify this woman as a
lesbian and have a negative attitude toward
this woman. This perceiver may then be more
alert to other negative attributes than to
positive attributes of this woman.
Individuals use stereotypes and
attitudes based on those stereotypes to react to
other individuals and groups (Fiske, 1998).
Discrimination occurs when individuals act in
a way to the advantage or disadvantage of
groups of people or of an individual perceived
to belong to those groups of people based on
these individuals’ stereotypes of those groups
of people (Fiske, 1998). Individuals are more
likely to act in an advantageous manner
towards members of these individuals’ own
group than toward members of other groups
(Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). For
example, a perceiver can have a stereotype of
gay men as being promiscuous. If this
perceiver were to be in charge of health care
for this man, this perceiver may withhold
helpful safe sex information for this man

because this perceiver believes this man is
promiscuous and will contract a sexually
transmitted infection (STI) eventually.
Sex and Sexual Orientation Stereotypes
Individuals have stereotypes about
men and women. There are both positive and
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes
of men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989;
Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman &
Goodwin, 2004). Positive stereotype
attributes about men are men are less likely
than women to be gullible, men are more
independent than are women, and men make
decisions more easily than do women.
Negative stereotype attributes about men are
men are more aggressive than are women,
men are more arrogant than are women, and
men are more insensitive than are women.
There are also both positive and negative
attributes in individuals’ stereotypes of
women. Positive stereotype attributes about
women are women are more nurturing than
are men, women are more helpful than are
men, and women are more aware of others’
feelings than are men. Negative stereotype
attributes about women are women are more
submissive than are men, women are more
nagging than are men, and women are more
melodramatic than are men.
Individuals have stereotypes about gay
men and lesbians. There are both positive and
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes
of gay men (e.g., Jackson & Sullivan, 1989;
Kite & Whitley, 1996; Madon, 1997; Taylor,
1983). Positive stereotype attributes about gay
men are gay men are more artistic than are
heterosexual men, gay men are less physically
threatening than are heterosexual men, and
gay men are neater than are heterosexual men.
Negative stereotype attributes about gay men
are gay men are more likely than heterosexual
men to molest children, gay men are more
flamboyant in behavior and dress than are
heterosexual men, and gay men are more
sexually promiscuous than are heterosexual
men. There are also both positive and
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes
of lesbians (Madon, 1997; Newman, 1989;
Taylor, 1983; Viss & Burn, 1992). Positive

stereotype attributes about lesbians are
lesbians are more independent than
heterosexual women, lesbians are more
intelligent than heterosexual women, and
lesbians are more open-minded than
heterosexual women. Negative stereotype
attributes about lesbians are that lesbians are
more aggressive than are heterosexual
women, lesbians are more unattractive than
are heterosexual women, and lesbians are
more sexually deviant than are heterosexual
women.
Men and women differ in how they
use stereotypes about other men and women
(Beauvais & Spence, 1987). When perceiving
others, men and women are more likely to pay
attention to sex of individuals than to other
factors (e.g., Beauvais & Spence, 1987). Men
and women use sex as a primary way to
categorize information about other people
(e.g., Beauvais & Spence, 1987). Both men
and women perceive women more favorably
than men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989).
Men and women may favor women to men
due to many factors (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic,
1989). Some of these factors are women are
perceived as less threatening than men and
that negative stereotyped attributes prescribed
to women are less hostile than those attributes
prescribed to men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic,
1989). If a woman succeeds at a masculine
task (e.g., fixing a flat tire), her success could
be perceived as due to situational causes (e.g.,
Swim & Sanna, 1996). If a man succeeds at a
masculine task (e.g., building a desk), his
success could be perceived as due to
dispositional causes (e.g., Swim & Sanna,
1996).
Men and women differ in how they
use stereotypes about gay men and lesbians
(Herek, 2000, 2002a; Herek & Capitanio,
1999). Men have more negative stereotypes
about gay men than do women (e.g., Herek &
Capitanio, 1999; Jellison, McConnell, &
Gabriel, 2004; LaMar & Kite, 1998). Men
also have more negative stereotypes about
gay men than about lesbians (e.g., Herek &
Capitanio, 1999; Jellison et al., 2004; LaMar
& Kite, 1998). Men have more favorable
attitudes toward lesbians than toward gay men

perhaps because men eroticize lesbian
sexuality and do not eroticize gay male
sexuality (e.g., Louderback & Whitley,
1997).Women have similarly negative
stereotypes about both gay men and lesbians
(e.g., LaMar & Kite, 1998).
The speculated reasons behind the
differences in men and women’s perceptions
of gay men and lesbians are many. Men’s
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians could
be influenced by sex roles (Madon, 1997).
Men may view gay men and lesbians as
violators of prescribed sex roles for men and
women (e.g, Madon, 1997). Women’s
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians could
be influenced by many factors (e.g., Basow &
Johnson, 2000). Women consider factors such
as parental attitudes and education as well as
violation of sex roles when forming attitudes
about gay men and lesbians (e.g., Basow &
Johnson, 2000).
Individuals use sex roles to distinguish
what traits are socially desirable for men and
women to possess (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989).
It is socially desirable for men to possess
positive masculine attributes such as
assertiveness and confidence (e.g., Prentice &
Carranza, 2002). It is socially desirable for
women to possess positive feminine attributes
such as nurturance and compassion (e.g.,
Prentice & Carranza, 2002). It is more
socially desirable for men to possess negative
masculine attributes such as arrogance and
greed than for men to possess negative
feminine attributes such as weakness and
gullibility (e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002). It
is more socially desirable for women to
possess negative feminine attributes such as
anxiety and difficulty making a decision than
for women to possess negative masculine
attributes such as aggression and insensitivity
(e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Men and
women who violate these sex roles may face
prejudice and discrimination against them
(e.g., Jellison et al., 2004).
Men, women, homosexuals, and
heterosexuals are each an ingroup (Eagly &
Stewart, 1995; Fiske, 1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi,
Eagly, & Stewart, 1995; Ostrom & Sedikides,
1992). An ingroup for men is other men, an

ingroup for women is other women, an
ingroup for homosexuals is other
homosexuals, and an ingroup for
heterosexuals is other heterosexuals.
Individuals favor their ingroup more than
their outgroups (Fiske, 1998; Ostrom &
Sedikides, 1992). An outgroup is a group of
individuals who do not belong to a perceiver’s
ingroup (Fiske, 1998; Messick & Mackie,
1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). For
example, a heterosexual man belongs to his
ingroup of heterosexuals and gay men and
lesbians belong to his outgroup of
homosexuals. Individuals often view
members of their ingroup as being more
diverse (i.e., heterogenous) than members of
an outgroup (e.g., De Cremer, 2001; Fiske,
1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi et al., 1995; Ostrom &
Sedikides, 1992). Individuals often view
members of an outgroup as more similar (i.e.,
homogenous) than members of their ingroup
(e.g., De Cremer, 2001; Fiske, 1998; LorenziCioldi et al., 1995; Ostrom & Sedikides,
1992).
Individuals view members of an
outgroup as homogenous, and these
individuals may rely upon their stereotypes of
these outgroups when interacting with
members of an outgroup (e.g., Hegarty &
Pratto, 2004; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992).
Individuals view members of their ingroups
as heterogenous, and these individuals may
not rely upon their stereotypes of their
ingroups when interacting with members of
their ingroup (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2004;
Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). All people are
not equally inclined to use stereotypes. Some
individuals may rely upon stereotypes more
than other individuals.
Whether or not individuals engage in
outgroup homogeneity may depend on other
individual differences (e.g., personality
differences). Individual differences may be a
factor in how individuals pay attention to
others, categorize others, remember
information about others, and infer attributes
about others. One such individual difference
is the extent to which individuals will process
and seek out information.
Need for Cognition

One individual difference that can affect
individuals' processing of information is need for
cognition. Need for cognition is defined to as "an
individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy
effortful cognitive endeavors" (Cacioppo, Petty,
& Kao, 1984, p. 306). Individuals high in need
for cognition seek out a variety of information
about a target and enjoy effortful thought and
problem solving (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).
Individuals low in need for cognition seek out
the least amount of information about a target
and do not enjoy effortful thought and problem
solving (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et
al., 1996). Individual differences in need for
cognition can be a factor in the way individuals
pay attention to information, interpret
information, remember information, and infer
from information (Cacioppo et al., 1996;
Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983) .
Because individuals high in need for
cognition seek out a variety of information about
a target, individuals high in need for cognition
are more likely than individuals low in need for
cognition to pay attention to a variety of
information (e.g., Verplanken, Hazenberg, &
Palenewen, 1992; Weiner, 1990). If an
individual pays attention to a variety of
information, this individual may notice
information that is stereotype-disconfirming
(e.g., Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990).
With more information that may include
stereotype-disconfirming information,
individuals high in need for cognition may not
rely upon stereotypes when perceiving others
(e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1996). If a perceiver high
in need for cognition, for example, meets a man
wearing flamboyant clothing, this perceiver may
notice other information about this man such as
paint brushes in this man's pocket, expensive
shoes, and a wedding band. Because individuals
low in need for cognition do not tend to seek out
a variety of information about a target,
individuals low in need for cognition are more
likely than individuals high in need for cognition
to pay attention to the least amount of
information needed about a target (e.g.,
Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990). If an
individual pays attention to a small amount of
information, this individual may not notice

information that is stereotype disconfirming
(e.g., Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990).
With less information that may not include
stereotype-disconfirming information,
individuals low in need for cognition may rely
upon stereotypes when perceiving others (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1996). If a perceiver low in need
for cognition, for example, meets a man wearing
flamboyant clothing, this perceiver may not
notice other information about this man.
Because individuals high in need for
cognition notice a variety of information about a
target, individuals high in need for cognition are
more likely than individuals low in need for
cognition to have a variety of interpretations for
information about a target (e.g., Dudley &
Harris, 2003; Weiner, 1990). With many
possible interpretations for information about a
target/others, individuals high in need for
cognition may not rely upon a single
interpretation of information based on a
stereotype (e.g., Sargent, 2004). A perceiver
high in need for cognition, for example, may
notice that a woman has short hair as well as
neatly applied makeup, painted nails, and is
wearing pants. Because this perceiver has a
variety of information, this perceiver may form
many interpretations of this information (such as
the woman being a businesswoman, a lesbian, or
a busy housewife) which may not be based on a
stereotype (Sargent, 2004). Because individuals
low in need for cognition notice the least
amount of information needed about a target,
individuals low in need for cognition are more
likely than individuals high in need for cognition
to have a small number of interpretations for
information about a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris,
2003; Weiner, 1990). With few possible
interpretations for information about a target,
individuals low in need for cognition may rely
upon a single interpretation of information based
on a stereotype (e.g., Sargent, 2004). A
perceiver low in need for cognition, for
example, may notice only that a woman has
short hair. Because this perceiver has a small
amount of information, this perceiver may form
only a few interpretation of this information that
may be based on a stereotype (such as the woman
being a lesbian because this perceiver has a
stereotype of lesbians having short hair).

Because individuals high in need for
cognition pay attention to a variety of information,
they are more likely than individuals low in need
for cognition to remember a variety of information
(e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986;
Cacioppo et al., 1983; Kardash & Noel, 2000).
Individuals high in need for cognition tend to seek
out additional information about a target (Cacioppo
et al., 1996). Individuals high in need for cognition
may remember both stereotype confirming
information and stereotype disconfirming
information when recalling a target (e.g., Cacioppo
et al., 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1983). A perceiver
high in need for cognition, for example, may notice
that a man wears flamboyant clothing, a wedding
band, expensive shoes, and carries paintbrushes.
This perceiver will remember a great deal of
information about this man when recalling this man
later. Because individuals low in need for cognition
do not pay attention to a variety of information,
they are more likely than individuals high in need
for cognition to remember a small amount of
information (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1986; Cacioppo
et al., 1983). Individuals low in need for cognition
tend to use stereotypes about a target (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1983).
Individuals low in need for cognition may
remember only stereotype confirming information
when recalling a target (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1986;
Cacioppo et al., 1983). A perceiver low in need for
cognition, for example, may notice only that a man
wears flamboyant clothing. This perceiver will
remember a small amount of information about this
man when recalling this man later.
Because individuals high in need for
cognition pay attention to a variety of information
and remember a variety of information about a
target, they are more likely than individuals low in
need for cognition not to infer stereotypical
attributes to a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris, 2003).
Individuals high in need for cognition seek out
many different kinds of information about a target
and do not need to infer other attributes of that target
when they have collected a wealth of information
about that target (e.g., Sargent, 2004). When
individuals high in need for cognition do not have
enough information about a target, these individuals
high in need for cognition will seek it out (e.g.,
Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000). Perceivers high in
need for cognition, for example, may notice and

remember that a woman has short hair, wears
makeup, has painted nails, and wears trousers.
Because this perceiver has many pieces of
information about that woman, this perceiver may
not infer other attributes of the woman (e.g., she is
into sports). Because individuals low in need for
cognition do not pay attention to a variety of
information and remember a variety of information
about a target, they are more likely than individuals
high in need for cognition to infer stereotypical
attributes to a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris, 2003).
Individuals low in need for cognition do not seek
out many different kinds of information about a
target and do need to infer other attributes of that
target because these individuals low in need for
cognition do not have enough information about that
target (e.g., Sargent, 2004). When individuals low in
need for cognition do not have enough information
about a target, these individuals low in need for
cognition will rely upon their stereotypes to
complete missing information (e.g., Levin et al.,
2000). Perceivers low in need for cognition may
notice and remember only that a woman has short
hair and wears trousers. Because this perceiver has
few pieces of information about that woman, this
perceiver may use a stereotype to infer other
attributes about that woman (e.g., she is a lesbian).
Hypotheses
Based on this review of the literature
pertaining to stereotypes, need for cognition, and
the attitudes of gay men and lesbians, there are a
few remaining questions. The attitudes of gay men
and lesbians towards heterosexuals were not as
thoroughly explored as were the attitudes of
heterosexuals towards gay men and lesbians. A
relationship between need for cognition and use of
stereotypes had also not been explored. After
reviewing the literature, three hypotheses were
formed. First, participants will stereotype other
individuals. That is, participants will attribute
masculine and feminine qualities to a target
individual depending on that target individual’s sex
(male versus female) and sexual orientation
(heterosexual versus homosexual). And second, the
tendency for participants to stereotype target
individuals will depend on these participants’ need
for cognition. That is, participants low in need for
cognition will be more likely than participants high
in need for cognition to stereotype target individuals

based on those target individuals’ sex and sexual
orientation.
Method
Participants
A total of 276 participants were
recruited for this study. One hundred sixtyseven students were recruited from
undergraduate psychology classes for this
study. Participants recruited from
undergraduate psychology classes received
extra credit in their classes for their
participation. Participants were able to choose
from many other studies to receive extra
credit. One hundred nine participants were
recruited from an annual Gay Pride event
during August 2004. The participants
recruited from this Gay Pride event received a
non-alcoholic beverage as compensation for
their participation. All of the participants
volunteered to take part in a study titled
“Individual Differences in Perceptions of
Social Groups.”
There were 159 females and 117
males in this sample. Most participants (68%)
were between the ages of 18 and 25 and were
either currently enrolled in a university or had
obtained an undergraduate degree. This
sample is therefore atypical (Sears, 1986).
Sears (1986) had found that participants who
have been involved in college tend to be more
open-minded and have been exposed to a
wider variety of people. Therefore, results
from this study may not generalize to the
general US population. Participants’ mean
age was 25.95 years (SD= 9.18 years).
Participants’ modal age was 20 years.
There were 213 Caucasian/White
participants, 23 African American/Black
participants, 21 Hispanic/Latino participants,
10 Asian/Pacific Islander participants, and 9
participants who chose other when asked
about their race. There were 169 participants
that identified themselves as heterosexual and
107 participants that identified themselves as
non-heterosexual (homosexual, bisexual, or
transgendered). The researcher of this study
discarded data from surveys in which a
participant did not specify a sexual orientation
or in which a participant wrote in a sexual

orientation that could not be classified as
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or
transgendered.
Participants were given informed
consent forms and were required to read and
agree to information in this informed consent
before continuing in this study. All
participants were treated in accordance with
the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and
Code of Conduct (American Psychological
Association, 2002).
Procedure
The method of gathering data at the
Gay Pride event was slightly different from
the method of gathering data at the University
of North Florida. Participants recruited from
the Gay Pride event were approached by a
female researcher and asked to volunteer for a
study. These participants were given a brief
overview of this study and what was expected
of them as participants. Participants were
seated with up to three other participants at a
table and all participants were given an
informed consent form. She explained this
informed consent to these participants.
Participants were given an option to keep this
informed consent form after they read it.
Participants from the Gay Pride event did not
sign these informed consent forms in order to
preserve anonymity. Anonymity was crucial
in order to establish good rapport with these
participants due to the sensitive nature of their
sexual orientation. This researcher reminded
participants that their participation was
voluntary and that they had the right to leave
at any time should they become
uncomfortable. Participants verbally agreed to
continue their participation in this study after
reading an informed consent.
Participants recruited from the
University of North Florida volunteered for
this study by signing up on a bulletin board in
the university’s psychology department.
Participants were called or e-mailed by this
researcher an evening before their
appointment to remind them of the time and
location for which they had signed up.
Participants were taken into a room and
seated with up to five other participants at a

table. A female researcher handed each
participant an informed consent form to read.
She informed participants of the general
purpose of this study, the importance of this
study, participants’ right to withdraw at any
time, the anticipated risks of this study, and
the box where participants were to put their
questionnaires upon completion. Participants
verbally agreed to continue their participation
in this study after reading an informed
consent. There were no other procedural
differences between the manner in which
participants were recruited from the Gay
Pride event and the manner in which
participants were recruited from the
University of North Florida.
This researcher gave participants a
five-page questionnaire and asked participants
to write their responses directly on this
questionnaire. Participants were instructed not
to put any identifying information on their
questionnaires. Participants were randomly
assigned one of four questionnaires: (1) a
questionnaire in which participants were
asked for their attitudes about a typical
lesbian/homosexual woman on the first page
and then asked for their attitudes about a
typical gay/homosexual man on the second
page, (2) a questionnaire in which participants
were asked for their attitudes about a typical
gay/homosexual man on the first page and
then asked for their attitudes about a typical
lesbian/homosexual woman on the second
page, (3) a questionnaire in which participants
were asked for their attitudes about a typical
straight/heterosexual man on the first page
and then asked for their attitudes about a
typical straight/heterosexual woman on the
second page, and (4) a questionnaire in which
participants were asked for their attitudes
about a typical straight/heterosexual woman
on the first page and then asked for their
attitudes about a typical straight/heterosexual
man on the second page. Order of the sex and
sexual orientation of these targets was
counterbalanced to control for possible
priming effects that sex and/or sexual
orientation may have had on these
participants’ attitudes.

Participants were asked to indicate
their attitudes toward each target using 40
items taken directly from the Bem Sex Role
Inventory (Bem, 1974). Examples of items
were ‘Makes decisions easily,’ ‘Warm,’ and
‘Acts as a leader.’ In the Bem Sex Role
Inventory there was a 20-item Masculinity
subscale and a 20-item Femininity subscale.
Participants could have viewed each target
person as masculine and/or as feminine.
Examples of items on the Masculinity
subscale were ‘Self-reliant,’ ‘Athletic,’ and
‘Assertive.’ Examples of items on the
Femininity subscale were ‘Yielding,’
‘Affectionate,’ and ‘Sensitive to the needs of
others.’
Participants judged these targets using
a 5-point scale with response options labeled
(a) not at all characteristic, (b) mostly not
characteristic, (c) sometimes characteristic,
(d) mostly characteristic, and (e) completely
characteristic. Responses to items on the
Masculinity and Femininity subscales of the
Bem Sex Role Inventory were scored
separately. Responses to individual items
were scored by assigning a numerical score of
1 to (a), 2 to (b), 3 to (c), 4 to (d), and 5 to (e).
Participants’ responses were scored to yield a
separate score on both the Masculinity
subscale and the Femininity subscale of the
Bem Sex Role Inventory. Scores on the
Masculinity subscale and scores on the
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory were summed separately to indicate
the participant’s attitude toward each target
person. Participants who viewed a target
person as masculine obtained scores on the
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory that ranged from 70-100 and
obtained scores on the Femininity subscale of
the Bem Sex Role Inventory that ranged from
20-69. Participants who viewed a target
person as feminine obtained scores on the
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory that ranged from 20-69 and
obtained scores on the Femininity subscale of
the Bem Sex Role Inventory that ranged from
70-100.
Several researchers (Bem, 1974; Bem,
1981; Wilson & Cook, 1984) have found

scores on the Bem Sex Role Inventory to be
reliable on both the Masculinity (Cronbach's
alphas of.86, .86, and .88, respectively) and
Femininity (Cronbach's alphas of .80, .82, and
.78, respectively) subscales. Bem reported
test-retest reliability correlations in her 1974
study for scores on the Bem Sex Role
Inventory (Masculinity r=.90, Femininity
r=.90). The test-retest reliability found on
scores in Bem’s (1974) study has also been
supported by Yanico (1985), in which female
students from a university were tested twice
over a 4-year interval. Yanico found a testretest correlation after the 4-year testing
interval for scores on both the Masculinity
(r=.56) and the Femininity (r=.68) subscales
of the Bem Sex Role Inventory.
In this study, when a target was a
heterosexual man, a Cronbach’s alpha of .89
was obtained from participants’ scores on the
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 was
obtained from participants’ scores on the
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory. When a target was a heterosexual
woman, a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was
obtained from participants’ scores on the
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was
obtained from participants’ scores on the
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory. When a target person was a
homosexual man, a Cronbach’s alpha of .81
was obtained from participants’ scores on the
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .79 was
obtained from participants’ scores on the
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory. When a target person was a
homosexual woman, a Cronbach’s alpha of
.83 was obtained from participants’ scores on
the Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 was
obtained from participants’ scores on the
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role
Inventory.
Bem (1974) found scores on the
Masculinity subscale and the Femininity
subscale of the Bem Sex Role Inventory to be
independent of one another. Bem found no

correlation between scores on the Bem Sex
Role Inventory and scores on the GuilfordZimmerman Temperament Survey tests used
to diagnose being bipolar. Many researchers
(e.g., Bohannon & Mills, 1979; Evans &
Dinning, 1982; Volentine, 1981) have found a
correlation between scores on the Fe scale of
the CPI and scores on the Bem Sex Role
Inventory. Although the Bem Sex Role
Inventory was designed using a normative
sample gathered from a college-aged
population, the Bem Sex Role Inventory has
been administered to people from many age
ranges without serious measurement problems
(Lenney, 1991).
On all four versions of the
questionnaire used in this study, there were
questions about demographic information on
the third page of this questionnaire.
Participants indicated their age by writing
their actual age on a blank line. Participants
indicated their race/ethnicity by circling either
(a) Caucasian/White, (b) African
American/Black, (c) Hispanic/Latino, (d)
Asian/Pacific Islander, or (e) Other.
Participants indicated their highest completed
level of education by circling either (a) No
high school diploma or GED, (b) High school
diploma or GED, (c) Some college, but no
degree, (d) Bachelor’s degree, or (e) Some
graduate education or graduate degree.
Participants indicated their sexual orientation
by circling either (a) Homosexual, (b)
Bisexual, (c) Transgender, or (d)
Heterosexual. Participants indicated how
“open” they were about their sexual
orientation by circling either (a) Completely
open, (b) Open to most people, (c) Open to
some people, (d) Open to a few people, or (e)
Not at all open. Participants who had
indicated that they were Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual, or Transgendered also indicated
how long they had identified as such by
circling either (a) Less than 1 year, (b) 1 to 5
years, (c) 6-10 years, or (d) More than 10
years.
The fourth and fifth pages of this
questionnaire were the 18-item Need for
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984). Cacioppo and Petty (1982) designed

the Need for Cognition Scale to assess
individual differences in participants’ need for
cognition. Participants read self-descriptive
statements of situations and ideas (e.g., “I
only think as hard as I have to”). Participants
then agreed or disagreed with these
statements. Participants responded to these
statements using a 5-point Likert scale: (a)
strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) neutral,
(d) agree, and (e) strongly agree. Half of the
items on the Need for Cognition Scale were
positively worded for need for cognition (e.g.,
“I would prefer complex to simple
problems.”). Agreement on these items
indicated a high need for cognition
(Cacioppo, et al., 1984). The other half of the
items on the Need for Cognition Scale were
negatively worded for need for cognition
(e.g., “I like tasks that require little thought
once I’ve learned them.”). Agreement on
these items indicated a low need for cognition
(Cacioppo, et al., 1984).
Responses to items on the Need for
Cognition Scale that were negatively worded
were reverse scored. Scores on individual
items were summed. Scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale could range from 18-90.
Participants were categorized as either high in
need for cognition or as low in need for
cognition according to a median split of
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale.
The researcher chose the 18-item
Need for Cognition Scale as opposed to the
34-item Need for Cognition Scale for this
study. Scores on both versions of the Need for
Cognition Scale were found to be highly
correlated (r=.95) with each other (Cacioppo,
et al., 1984; Cacioppo et al., 1996). Several
researchers (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan,
1992; Kernis, Granneman, & Barclay, 1992;
Verplanken, 1993) have found scores on the
Need for Cognition Scale to be internally
consistent and reliable (Cronbach’s alphas of
greater than or equal to .85). Sadowski and
Gulgoz (1992) found a test-retest reliability of
.88 over a 7-week testing interval using the
18-item Need for Cognition Scale. A
Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was derived from
scores obtained from the current sample using
the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale.

Researchers have found a high need
for cognition as defined by scores on
measures of Need for Cognition to be
positively related to behavior such as
enjoying thought, actively pursuing
information, seeking out and focusing on
relevant information when making decisions
(Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), being openminded (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), and
using empirical facts on which to base their
judgments (Leary, Sheppard, McNeil,
Jenkins, & Barnes, 1986). In contrast,
researchers have found a high need for
cognition as defined by scores on measures
of Need for Cognition to be negatively related
to behavior such as a tendency to (a) overlook
or ignore information that is new
(Venkatraman, Marlino, Kardes, & Skylar,
1990), (b) prefer predictable situations and
people (Petty & Jarvis, 1996; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994), (c) be close-minded (Petty
& Jarvis, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994),
and (d) be decisive (Petty & Jarvis, 1996;
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
While participants completed their
questionnaires, a researcher remained nearby
to answer any questions and to watch for
signs of distress. This researcher was able to
refer participants recruited from the
University of North Florida to a counseling
service on campus if necessary. Participants
placed their completed questionnaires in an
unmarked box at the end of a table and
collected their beverage if recruited from
Pride or their extra credit slip if recruited
from the University of North Florida before
leaving this testing area.
Results
The design of this study was a 2
(participant need for cognition: high or low)
by 2 (target sex: male or female) by 2 (target
sexual orientation: heterosexual or nonheterosexual) by 2 (gender of attributions:
masculine or feminine) factorial design. The
between-subjects predictor variables of this
study were participant need for cognition and
target sexual orientation. The within-subjects
predictor variables of this study were gender
attributions and target sex. The criterion

variable of this study was participant ratings
of targets on a measure of masculinity and
femininity. Results were analyzed using an
analysis of variance procedure.
Preliminary Analyses
Because participant sex and
participant need for cognition were measured
and not manipulated, it was necessary to run
preliminary data analyses to determine if
there was multicolinearity between these
variables. A chi-square analysis was run with
participant sex (male versus female) and
participant need for cognition (high versus
low) as independent variables. Participant sex
was not significantly related to participant
need for cognition, χ2 (1, N = 276) = 1.12, p =
0.29. In this sample, participant sex was not
confounded with participant need for
cognition.
Main Analyses
It was predicted that participants
would engage in stereotyping targets by
making certain personality attributions of
these targets. Specifically, it was expected
that participants would engage in stereotyping
by attributing more masculine than feminine
qualities to heterosexual male targets, by
attributing more feminine than masculine
qualities to heterosexual female targets, by
attributing more feminine qualities to
homosexual male targets than to heterosexual
male targets, and by attributing more
masculine qualities to homosexual female
targets than to heterosexual female targets.
Support for this hypothesis is found in the
introduction of this paper. This tendency to
stereotype was expected to be more evident
for participants low in need for cognition than
for participants high in need for cognition.
Support for this hypothesis would be evident
by a four-way interaction between the
following variables: participant need for
cognition (high vs. low), target sexual
orientation (heterosexual vs. homosexual),
target sex (male vs. female), and gender of
attributions (masculine vs. feminine).

Main Effects. There was a main effect of
target sex on participant ratings of targets
across measures of both masculinity and
femininity, F(1, 272) = 19.07, p < .01.
Participants made more extreme ratings of
female targets (M = 69.17, SD = 5.68) than of
male targets (M = 64.86, SD = 5.30)
regardless of participant need for cognition,
target sexual orientation, and attribution
gender.
There was also a main effect of
attribution gender on participant ratings
across all targets, F(1, 272) = 63.29, p < .01.
Participants made more extreme ratings on
masculine items (M = 67.38, SD = 6.47) than
on feminine items (M = 63.65, SD = 6.03)
regardless of participant need for cognition,
target sex, or target sexual orientation.
Interactions. There was a two-way
interaction between target sex and attribution
gender on participant ratings of targets across
measures of both masculinity and femininity,
F(1, 272) = 72.82, p < .01. This two-way
interaction was qualified by a three-way
interaction which involved target sex,
attribution gender, and target sexual
orientation, F(1, 272) = 419.46, p < .001. This
three-way interaction was qualified by a fourway interaction which involved target sex,
target sexual orientation, attribution gender in
addition, and participant need for cognition,
F(1, 272) = 4.02, p < .05.
This four-way interaction was broken
down into two “simple” three-way
interactions (target sex, participant need for
cognition, and gender of attributions)
blocking on target sexual orientation. This
simple three-way interaction was not reliable
when the target sexual orientation was
homosexual, F < 1.00. In other words, this
simple three-way interaction was, however,
reliable when the target sexual orientation
was heterosexual, F(1,138) = 4.81, p < .01.
This reliable simple three-way
interaction with heterosexual targets was then
broken down into two “simple” two-way
interactions (target sex and gender of
attribution) blocking on participant need for
cognition. This simple two-way interaction

was reliable with participants low in need for
cognition, F(1,69) = 132.62, p < .01. This
simple two-way interaction was also reliable
with participants high in need for cognition,
F(1,69) = 212.12, p < .01.
Both reliable simple two-way
interactions were then broken down into
“simple” main effects using gender of the
attribution. There was a simple main effect
for attribution gender for participants low in
need for cognition rating heterosexual male
targets, F(1,69) = 107.08, p < .01. Individuals
low in need for cognition rated heterosexual
male targets as more masculine (M = 73.60,
SD = 8.25) than feminine (M = 55.83, SD =
8.80). There also was a simple main effect for
gender for participants low in need for
cognition rating heterosexual female targets,
F(1,69) = 93.54, p < .01. Individuals low in
need for cognition rated heterosexual female
targets as more feminine (M = 71.63, SD =
6.45) than masculine (M = 60.29, SD = 7.19).
Similarly, there was a simple main
effect for gender for participants high in need
for cognition rating heterosexual male targets,
F(1,69) = 167.44, p < .01. Individuals high in
need for cognition also rated heterosexual
male targets as more masculine (M = 76.43,
SD = 9.41) than feminine (M = 53.70, SD =
8.78). Additionally, there was a simple main
effect for gender for participants high in need
for cognition rating heterosexual female
targets, F(1,69) = 85.03, p < .01. Individuals
high in need for cognition also rated
heterosexual female targets as more feminine
(M = 74.44, SD = 8.68) than masculine (M =
60.2, SD = 8.67).
In short, participants high in need for
cognition made more extreme masculine
ratings of heterosexual male targets than did
participants low in need for cognition.
Participants high in need for cognition also
made more extreme feminine ratings of
heterosexual female targets than did
participants low in need for cognition. In this
sample, individuals high in need for cognition
were apparently more likely than individuals
low in need for cognition to rely upon sex role
stereotypes when thinking about heterosexual
persons.

Discussion
There were two hypotheses in this
study about stereotyping and need for
cognition. It was hypothesized that
participants would stereotype other
individuals (targets) such that participants
would attribute masculine and feminine
qualities to a target depending on that target’s
sex (male versus female) and sexual
orientation (heterosexual versus homosexual).
Specifically, participants would stereotype
heterosexual men as more masculine than
feminine and heterosexual women as more
feminine than masculine. Similarly,
participants would stereotype homosexual
men as more feminine than masculine and
homosexual women as more masculine than
feminine. It was also hypothesized that
participants would stereotype more or less
depending on these participants’ need for
cognition. Specifically, it was expected that
participants low in need for cognition would
be more likely than participants high in need
for cognition to stereotype target individuals
based on those target individuals’ sex and
sexual orientation.
The first hypothesis of this study was
largely supported. Participants stereotyped
targets based on target sex and target sexual
orientation. As expected, participants thought
heterosexual male targets had more masculine
traits than feminine traits. Similarly,
participants thought heterosexual female
targets had more feminine traits than
masculine traits. These results are consistent
with other results in which researchers found
that men were thought of as more masculine
than feminine and women were thought of as
more feminine than masculine (e.g., Eagly &
Mladinic, 1989; Lenney, 1991; Prentice &
Carranza, 2002).
As expected, participants thought of
homosexual female targets as possessing
more masculine traits than feminine traits.
Other researchers have also found that
participants thought of homosexual women as
violating traditional feminine sex-roles (e.g.,
Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; Taylor,
1983) and thought of homosexual women as

being similar to heterosexual men (e.g., Kite
& Deaux, 1987).
Contrary to expectations, participants
did not think homosexual male targets had
more feminine traits than masculine traits.
Instead, participants thought homosexual
male targets were androgynous. Androgynous
individuals have both masculine traits and
feminine traits (Bem, 1974). These results are
consistent with other results in which
researchers found that homosexual men were
thought of as more androgynous than as
masculine or feminine. For example,
McDonald and Moore (1978) found that
homosexual men viewed themselves as more
androgynous than as feminine or as
masculine. Similarly, Robinson, Skeen, and
Flake-Hobson (1982) conducted research
using both homosexual and heterosexual male
participants. These researchers found that
homosexual men are more comfortable
thinking of themselves as androgynous than
are heterosexual men. Contrary to these
findings, other researchers found that
participants thought of homosexual men as
violating traditional masculine sex-roles (e.g.,
Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004;
Madon, 1997) and thought of homosexual
men as being similar to heterosexual women
(e.g., Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997).
The second hypothesis of this study
was not supported. Participants low in need
for cognition did not stereotype more than
participants high in need for cognition.
Contrary to this hypothesis, participants high
in need for cognition stereotyped more than
did participants low in need for cognition.
This finding was significant when participants
were asked to think about heterosexual male
but not heterosexual female, homosexual
male, or homosexual female targets. This
finding is partially supported by other
researchers such as Crawford and Skowronski
(1998) who found that participants high in
need for cognition and participants low in
need for cognition both use stereotypes.
Haugvedt and Petty (1992) also found that
when presented with an unfamiliar target,
participants high in need for cognition and
participants low in need for cognition both

had similar attitudes about an unfamiliar
target. It is possible that a portion of
participants in this sample did not have much
personal exposure with groups such as
homosexual men and homosexual women.
This lack of exposure to groups such as
homosexual men and homosexual women
would make these groups unfamiliar to
participants high in need for cognition and
low in need for cognition. If these targets
were unfamiliar to participants high in need
for cognition and low in need for cognition,
then these participants could have similar
thoughts about these unfamiliar groups.
Participants also could have been
influenced by situational factors such as
cognitive load (Dudley & Harris, 2002). A
heavy cognitive load occurs when individuals
experience a large amount of information
(Dudley & Harris, 2002). Because individuals
must expend some cognitive resources
separating important information from
unimportant information, these individuals
may not be able to focus on relevant
information (Dudley & Harris, 2002). These
individuals may then spend little time
thinking about a target based on that target’s
individual characteristics and rely heavily on
heuristics such as stereotypes to lessen
cognitive load (Dudley & Harris, 2002). If
participants high in need for cognition were
experiencing a heavy cognitive load during
this study, then these participants may have
also used stereotypes.
Plausible Alternative Explanations
There are a few plausible alternative
explanations for the results of this study. It is
possible that participants engaged in socially
desirable responding. Participants could have
been attempting to appear socially appropriate
by responding to questions according to
widely held stereotypes about men and
women as well as homosexuals and
heterosexuals. To mitigate this possible
alternative explanation, participants were
informed that their answers would be
anonymous. However, it is still possible that
participants felt some pressure to respond in a
socially desirable manner. Given the

methodology of this study (i.e., anonymity of
answers and participation), this possible
alternative explanation is not plausible.
Additionally, participants did not respond as
expected. Participants thought of gay men as
being androgynous. A widely held stereotype
about gay men is that gay men are more
feminine than masculine (e.g., Jackson &
Sullivan, 1989; Kite & Whitley, 1996;
Madon, 1997). Thus, participants did not
engage in socially desirable responding
because they did not respond with this widely
held stereotype about gay men.
It is possible that participants high in
need for cognition and participants low in
need for cognition both stereotype for
different reasons. Participants high in need for
cognition are less likely than participants low
in need for cognition to use simple heuristics
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). Participants high in
need for cognition, however, are more likely
than participants low in need for cognition to
have exposure to media such as newspapers
and television (Cacioppo et al., 1996). People
in the media often rely upon sex role and
sexual orientation stereotypes (e.g., Hurtz &
Durkin, 2004; Kolbe & Langefeld, 1993;
Renn & Calvert, 1993). The more individuals
are exposed to information, the easier these
individuals can access this information
(Schneider, 2004). Because participants high
in need for cognition could have had more
exposure than participants low in need for
cognition to these sex role and sexual
orientation stereotypes in the media,
participants high in need for cognition could
have been primed by this repeated media
exposure to respond to questions in this study
using stereotypes (Cacioppo et al., 1983).
Limitations
There were a few limitations of this
study. One limitation was the methodology
used in this study. Participants were asked to
answer self-report measures about broad
categories of people. These results may not
have been the same had the researchers of this
study looked at participants’ behavior.
Another way to measure participants’
stereotypes would be to use tests such as the

Implicit Association Test (IAT) which is used
to measure participant response time
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).
Participants respond faster to words that are
consistent with these participants’ stereotypes
than to words that are inconsistent with these
participants’ stereotypes (e.g., Brendl,
Markman, & Messner, 2001; Greenwald et al,
1998; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, &
Schwartz, 1999). If participants were asked to
think about lesbians and these participants
had a stereotype that lesbians were masculine,
for example, then these participants would
respond faster if presented with a word that
was consistent with his/her stereotype such as
“aggressive” than if presented with a word
that was inconsistent with his/her stereotype
such as “gentle.” Another way to measure
participants’ stereotypes would be to use tests
such as the “startle eye blink.” Mahaffey,
Bryan, and Hutchinson (2005) used the
“startle eye blink” measure to look at
participants’ affective responses to
homosexual men, homosexual women, and
homosexual couples. These researchers found
that when participants with a strong anti-gay
bias were exposed to photographs of
homosexuals, these participants had a strong
physiological reaction (i.e., blinking).
Another limitation of this study was
recruitment of participants. Approximately
half of the participants in this study were
recruited from a mid-sized north Florida
university whereas approximately half of the
participants in this study were recruited from
a Gay Pride event in north Florida.
Participants recruited from the university
setting may have had different expectations
about this study than did participants recruited
from the Gay Pride event. Participants
recruited from the university were tested
within a lab at the university and these
participants could have been primed by their
setting to take this study more seriously than
did participants recruited at the Gay Pride
event. Participants recruited at the Gay Pride
event were tested outdoors within the context
of a celebration and these participants could
have been primed by their setting to take this

study less seriously than did participants
recruited at the university.
Future Directions
Future directions for this area of
research include broadening the nature of
targets. For example, there are only a few
researchers who have looked at people’s
perceptions of bisexual men and women (e.g.,
Herek, 2002). Additionally, there are only a
few researchers who have looked at what
homosexuals think of groups such as
heterosexuals and bisexuals (e.g., Lyons,
Brenner, & Fassinger, 2005; White &
Franzini, 1999). Lack of research on the
views of homosexuals, bisexuals, and
transgendered individuals may have a
negative impact on matters such as social
policy and law making. Many people who
make laws, policies, and medical research
consider only a population made up of
heterosexual men and women and rarely
consider homosexual, bisexual, or
transgendered individuals. This lack of
consideration leads to biased laws, policies,
and medical research.
Other future directions include
looking at behavior rather than answers on a
self-report measure. The researchers of this
study looked at participants’ responses on a
questionnaire and not at what participants
would actually do when interacting with a gay
or lesbian individual. It would be interesting
to look at what participants thought about
homosexual men and women when answering
a questionnaire and then to look at how these
same participants interacted with an
individual who was gay or lesbian.
Researchers that looked at both participants’
responses to questionnaires and then looked at
these same participants’ interactions with
individuals who were gay or lesbian might
find a correlation between reported attitudes
and behavior may be established.
Alternatively, it would be interesting to see if
participants who interacted with a gay or
lesbian individual would later have stronger
or weaker stereotypes about homosexual men
and women based on these participants’
interactions with gay and lesbian individuals.

Other future directions include
looking at how stereotyped groups such as
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are treated
by health care providers and medical
researchers. For example, other researchers
have found that lesbians and bisexual women
engage in many risky sexual behaviors and
are exposed to sexually transmitted diseases
(e.g., Champion, Wilford, Shain, & Piper,
2005; Morrow & Allsworth, 2000). Due to
this lack of research and information about
lesbians, most medical information about
females is written specifically about
heterosexual women (e.g., Arend, 2005;
Youngman & Meryn, 2004). Other
researchers have found that gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals have had
unsatisfactory experiences with health care
providers due to these health care providers’
lack of knowledge about gay, lesbian, and
bisexual health needs (e.g., Allen, Glciken,
beach, & Naylor, 1998; Beehler, 2001;
Bonvicini & Perlin, 2003). Additionally,
health care providers may have stereotypes
about gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals that
could bias how health care providers treat gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals (e.g., Beehler,
2001; Dean, Meyer, Robinson, Sell, Sember,
Silenzio et al., 2000).
Conclusions
Individuals use stereotypes when
perceiving men and women as well as
homosexuals and heterosexuals. The way
individuals use stereotypes may affect the
way these individuals judge groups of people
such as men and women as well as
homosexuals and heterosexuals. Stereotypes,
even though used by everyone, can be
harmful when used to create laws and social
sanctions on certain groups. Negative
stereotypes about groups such as homosexuals
can lead to discrimination based on
membership in these stereotyped groups.
People who discriminate against homosexuals
may commit acts of discrimination which
include violence. For example, recall the well
publicized murder of Matthew Sheppard in
Laramie, Wyoming

(http://abcnews.go.com/2020/print?id=27768
5). Matthew was beaten and left to die in the
cold by a group of young men who knew that
Matthew was gay. People who discriminate
against homosexuals have also supported laws
which separate homosexuals from the
majority in an unequal way by refusing
certain privileges or rights. For example, the
Defense of Marriage Act (1996) was written
to prevent homosexuals from marrying. Law
makers defined marriage as one man and one
woman. So, gay men and lesbians cannot get
married. Married couples gain many federal
rights and protections such as tax breaks and
hospital visitation. If more individuals were
made aware of the prevalence of stereotypes
and the inaccuracies of these stereotypes,
there is a chance that these negative
stereotypes can be dispelled and groups such
as gay men and lesbians can gain equal rights
and experience less violence and
discrimination than gay men and lesbians
have experienced in the past.
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